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A prevalent and important coordination mechanism in dialogue is com-
municative ‘listener feedback’ in form of short verbal-vocal signals (e.g.,
‘uh-huh’, ‘yeah’, ‘huh’), head gestures (e.g., nodding, wiggling) or facial
expressions. Listeners’ feedback signals are indications of their cogni-
tive state and communicate whether listeners and speakers are in con-
tact, whether listeners perceive, understand and accept the speakers’
utterance as well as whether they agree to or which attitude they have
towards the speakers’ utterance (Allwood et al., 1992).
Feedback signals are rich in their form – enabling a fine-grained ex-
pression of subtle differences in meaning –, multi-functional, and in-
teract heavily with their dialogue context. Consequentially, feedback
is only conventionalised to a certain degree. Speakers are nevertheless
able to interpret communicative feedback, use it to reason about the lis-
tener’s cognitive state as well as their common ground, and adapt their
language accordingly (Clark, 1996).
Our objective is to model this ability of human speakers for artifi-
cial conversational agents (e.g., dialogue systems, embodied conversa-
tional agents), making them attentive to their users’ needs as expressed
in their feedback behaviour (Buschmeier & Kopp, 2011).
Here we present an agent-centric cognitive model for the interpreta-
tion of feedback signals in their dialogue context. It uses features of
the feedback behaviour observed by the agent as well as the agent’s ut-
terance, expectations and knowledge about the task to reason about an
‘attributed listener state’ (ALS; the agent’s reconstruction of the user’s
cognitive state) and the grounding status of information. Using the
framework of Bayesian networks, the model represents ALS and com-
mon ground probabilistically in terms of degrees of belief. Because of
this, it is straightforward to deal with the uncertainties inherent in the
observations, the form-meaning relation of a feedback signal and the
user’s behaviour.
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The revision of mental representations is necessary whenever reason-
ers encounter conflicting, yet trustworthy information. The aim of such
a revision process is to regain consistency of the mental representa-
tion with the new information about the state of affairs. In the spatial
domain it is assumed that resolving such a conflict of information by
reestablishing consistency is achieved by modification of the initially
held spatial representation. Little is known about the nature of this
modification process. Even though a great deal of research has been
concerned with the construction and inspection of mental representa-
tions in the spatial domain, there is basically no research investigating
the processes underlying the revision of such representations. The aim
of our research is to present a first insight into these processes. In our ex-
periments we operationalize “revision” as the relocation of an object in
a given spatial layout. After learning a visually presented linear spatial
layout of different objects (e.g. peach – pear – kiwi – apple) participants
get a verbal piece of information about the spatial relation of two of
the layout’s objects (e.g., the kiwi is to the left of the peach) that is in-
consistent with the arrangement of the objects in the initial layout. The
participants’ task is to integrate the new information by modifying the
initial layout so that a revised layout, consistent with the verbal infor-
mation, results (e.g., kiwi – peach – pear – apple). This paradigm allows
us to systematically vary certain aspects of the task, such as the distance
the to-be-relocated object has to be “moved” within the layout as well
